By holding that the judiciary cannot fetter Governors and the President to “one-size-fits-all” timetables or usurp their functions by assuming “deemed consent” of proposed Bills by States, and also clarifying that these authorities cannot resort to “prolonged and evasive inaction”, the Supreme Court’s answer to the 16th Presidential Reference appears as a constitutional balancing act. But, substantively, it is a blow to federalism as it effectively allows Governors unchecked powers to block or delay State legislation without constitutional accountability. This opinion contradicts a progressive judgment in April 2025 that had prescribed three-month timelines and used Article 142 to grant deemed assent to some Bills passed in the Tamil Nadu Assembly. The Court invoked separation of powers to reject timelines and Article 142’s use, but this empowers Governors at the cost of State rights. The judgment claims that Articles 200 and 201 prescribe no deadlines, but disregards explicit constitutional text. In Article 200, the Governor must declare his decision “as soon as possible” — the Court called it too “elastic” to support timelines, rendering constitutional text unenforceable. The Court’s assertion that Governors are not bound by the Council of Ministers’ aid and advice contradicts constitutional history. The framers explicitly removed the phrase “in his discretion” — a phrase in the Government of India Act, 1935 — from Articles 200 and 201. Even the Punchhi Commission recommended a six-month period for Governors to decide on Bills.
The Court did rule that withholding assent must be followed by returning the Bill to the Assembly. But the judgment rules that even if the Assembly passes the Bill a second time, the Governor retains the option to reserve it for the President. This kills the binding nature of the legislature’s second passage. Consequently, whether at first instance or after reconsideration, a Governor can refer a Bill to the President under Article 200. Once there, Bills can languish indefinitely as the judgment ruled that the President has no obligation to consult the Court. The Assembly has no recourse to re-pass Bills in a binding manner, and the judgment provides no guidance on when referring a Bill to the President is appropriate. While the judgment talks of a “limited mandamus” for prolonged inaction, it refuses to define what constitutes a “reasonable period of time”, forcing States into legal battles to prove delay. By removing procedural safeguards (timelines and deemed assent), extraordinary remedies (Article 142), and oversight (judicial review of actions under Article 200), the Court’s opinion has allowed the possibility of executive overreach. States have little mechanism to challenge arbitrary delays, no automatic approval after reasonable periods, and no remedy when Bills are referred to the President, even on subjects under the State List. And these are situations that have recently transpired in many Opposition-ruled States. The Court appears to have found a way to turn the letter against the spirit of the Constitution.
This Editorial was corrected for a factual error